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A two-way fixed effects Poisson model is used to investigate the impact of 43 EPA-sponsored 
pollution prevention (P2) practices on compliance and enforcement for a sample of facilities 
in the US manufacturing sector. I find that P2 adoption reduces environmental violations in 
three  industries  while  increasing  violations  in  two  others.  P2  adoption  also  spurs  fewer 
enforcement  actions  in  three  industries.  I  further  partition  the  P2  practices  into  three 
categories based on their approach to improve environmental performance. In doing so, I find 
that  practices  that  involve  changes  in  operating  procedures--about  a  third  of  adopted  P2 
practices--such as instituting a self-inspection and monitoring program to discover spills or 
leak sources, improving maintenance scheduling and/or labeling procedures, are effective in 
reducing violations while practices that involve equipment or material changes are not. I also 
find that adopters of practices that require changes in either procedures or manufacturing 
equipment--about half of adopted practices--are rewarded with a more cooperative treatment 
of environmental infractions with fewer enforcement actions. 
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I. Introduction 
Voluntary pollution prevention by private firms has become an integral part of contemporary 
U.S.  environmental  policy.  The  passage  of  the  Pollution  Prevention  Act  (PPA)  in  1990 
established  a  federal  policy  that  prioritizes  pollution  prevention  (P2)  practices  over 
downstream waste treatment activities.  The PPA defines a P2 practice as “any practice which 
(i) reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant entering any 
waste stream or otherwise released into the environment (including fugitive emissions) prior 
to  recycling,  treatment,  or  disposal;  and  (ii)  reduces  the  hazards  to  public  health  and  the 
environment  associated  with  the  release  of  such  substances,  pollutants,  or  contaminants.” 
Examples  of  P2  practices  include  equipment  and  raw  material  modifications  such  as 
installation of a vapor recovery system, substituting less toxic solvents for hazardous solvents; 
procedural changes such as setting up a clearinghouse to exchange materials that otherwise 
would be discarded, self-inspection and monitoring program to discover spills or leak sources. 
The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) contains information on the adoption of 43 voluntary P2 
practices by US facilities since 1991(see Table 1).  
The government’s hope with the passage of the PPA is to induce voluntary corporate 
environmental  investments  that  spur  source  reductions  for  the  targeted  pollutants.  The 
benefits of P2 adoption may also spill over to non-target pollutants since most of the P2 
practices entail comprehensive changes in operating procedures or the production process. 
Furthermore,  P2  adoption  may  infuse  a  pollution  prevention  ethic  within  corporate 
management  that  prompts  employee  training  programs  and  other  investments  in  waste 
prevention that lower releases across all media, thereby reducing environmental violations.   4
Therefore the main objective of this study is to explore empirically if the adoption of EPA-
sponsored voluntary P2 practices works to improve compliance with environmental law. 
 To prompt the adoption of P2 practices, the EPA has imbedded in its enforcement 
settlement process the option of reducing penalties against violators who voluntarily perform 
P2  activities  above  and  beyond  the  mandatory  actions  required  to  correct  the  violation 
(USEPA, 1998; Burnett, 1998).  Additionally and consonant with the enforcement theory 
(Maxwell and Decker, 2006), the EPA may have rewarded P2 adopters with a more relaxed 
regulatory  regime,  reducing  the  frequency  of  costly  environmental  inspections  and 
enforcement actions. Therefore a second objective is to explore the effects of P2 adoption on 
the regulator’s enforcement of environmental law. 
A number of studies have sought to explain why profit-driven firms voluntarily agree 
to  adopt  costly  environmentally  friendly  programs  and  whether  such  programs  have 
succeeded in reducing pollution from levels that would otherwise have been produced.  Most 
of the empirical research focuses on firms’ participation in the EPA’s 33/50 program (Arora 
and Cason, 1995, 1996; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Gamper-
Rabindran, 2006; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007; Sam and Innes, 2008), the Green Lights and 
Waste wise programs (Videras and Alberini, 2000), the Climate Challenge program (Welch et 
al., 2000); and the adoption of Environmental Management Systems such as Total Quality 
Environmental  Management  (Anton  et  al.  ,  2004;  Uchida  and  Ferraro,  2007;  Sam  et  al., 
2007). The 33/50 program is the EPA’s first formal effort to achieve  voluntary pollution 
reduction by regulated firms.  However, the 33/50 was limited in its scope (it targeted only 17 
chemicals out of more than 650 in the TRI database) and in time (from 1991 to 1995).    5
Voluntary pollution reductions may also be induced by factors other than participation 
in a government-sponsored program. For example, Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) find 
that facilities located in richer communities significantly overcomply with water pollution 
regulations.  McClelland  and  Horowitz  (1999)  also  report  anecdotal  evidence  that 
overcompliance  is  driven  by  community  pressure  and  a  desire  for  a  less  adversarial 
relationship with regulators. 
More closely related to this work are papers that examine the impact of voluntary 
environmental investments by private  firms on their compliance  rates. Using a sample of 
more than 3,700 US facilities regulated under state and federal air pollution laws, Potoski and 
Prakash (2005) find that the adoption of the ISO 14001 environmental management standard 
elicits reduced spells of environmental noncompliance. In the same realm, Dasgupta et al. 
(2000) find that adoption of the ISO 14001 standard led to higher self-reported compliance 
rates  for  a  cross  section  of  Mexican  manufacturing  facilities.
1  Stafford  (2003)  finds  that 
facilities located in a state that has a voluntary P2 program are less likely to be in violation of 
state hazardous waste regulations. Using a cross section of plants in four US manufacturing 
industries, Decker (2005) finds that facilities in the Chemicals and Pulp and Paper industries 
with lower TRI to plant capacity ratios, i.e. more environmentally efficient plants, are less 
likely to be targeted for inspections related to Clean Air Act (CAA) regulated releases.  It is 
argued in Decker (2005) that since most of the TRI chemicals are not regulated, lower TRI 
releases  can  be  interpreted  as  the  outcome  of  firms’  voluntary  investment  in  abatement 
                                                 
1 ISO 14001 environmental management standard consists essentially of identifying the environmental attributes 
of  the  firm’s  products,  formulating  an  environmental  policy  statement  based  on  the  gathered  information, 
developing environmental performance targets, establishing an Environmental Management System (EMS) to 
achieve the stated goals, and undertaking periodic evaluations of the EMS to ensure its effectiveness. See e.g., 
Dasgupta et al. (2000) or Protoski and Prakash (2005), or www.iso.org for a more extensive discussion of ISO 
14001.   6
technologies. This logic is undermined, however, by the fact that a number of TRI chemicals 
are  directly  regulated  under  the  CAA  or  the  Clear  Water  Act  for  example 
(http://www.epa.gov/tri/chemical/94regmat.pdf).  Not  accounting  for  the  presence  of  these 
regulated  chemicals  in  the  TRI  data  may  confound  the  econometric  results,  making 
meaningful inference difficult.  
The present study differs significantly from these efforts in that I examine the effects 
on environmental compliance and enforcement of a diverse set of 43 EPA-sponsored (but 
voluntary) P2 practices which are adopted by facilities in order to continuously reduce waste 
generation  of  some  650  toxic  chemicals  in  the  TRI  database.  These  practices  differ 
considerably in their approach to reduce pollution. As can be seen from Table 1, some of the 
practices  require  changes  in  operational  routines;  others  require  investment  in  cleaner 
technologies while others require modifications or substitution of raw materials. To gauge 
which of these approaches to pollution prevention is more effective at improving compliance, 
I follow Deltas et al. (2006) and partition the 43 P2 practices into three categories based on 
their functional attributes. The empirical analysis is undertaken using a panel of 1,424 US 
facilities whose parent companies are S&P 500 firms operating in the manufacturing sector 
over  the  period  1991  to  2004.  In  studying  the  effects  of  P2  adoption  on  environmental 
compliance  and  enforcement,  I  also  control  for  potential  impacts  of  environmental 
constituencies (using a time-series of state-level Sierra Club membership) and several other 
explanators drawn from related work.  
The econometric results indicate that the effect of P2 adoption on compliance and 
enforcement varies by industry and by the attributes of the P2 practices. Specifically, I find 
that  P2  adoption  reduces  violation  rates  in  three  industries  (Paper  and  Allied  Products,   7
Primary  Metal  Industries,  and    Electrical  Equipment  and  Components)  while  increasing 
violations in two others (Paper and Allied Products, Transportation equipment).  P2 adoption 
is also associated with fewer enforcement rates in three industries (Fabricated metal products, 
Transportation equipment, and Measuring and analyzing instruments). Moreover, I find that 
P2  practices  that  entail  changes  in  operating  procedures  yield  fewer  violations  across  all 
industries while P2 practices that involve equipment or material changes do not. I also find 
that regulators afford adopters of P2 practices that involve a change in either procedures or 
manufacturing equipment a more cooperative treatment of infractions with fewer enforcement 
actions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses hypotheses 
on the effects of P2 adoption on environmental compliance and enforcement that are tested in 
the  paper.    In  sections  III  and  IV,  I  discuss  the  data  and  the  econometric  specifications.  
Section V presents the estimation results.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Hypotheses 
Enacted in 1990, the Pollution Prevention Act established pollution prevention as the 
first option of pollution abatement; the adoption of P2 practices is however voluntary. The 
government’s policy shift toward voluntary pollution reductions by profit-seeking firms is 
predicated on the expectation that P2 adopters will invest to re-engineer their products, re-
design  their  production  processes,  and  improve  operating  procedures  in  order  to  reduce 
pollution at the source therefore lower their cleanup and regulatory compliance costs. Even 
when P2 practices are not targeted at chemicals that are directly regulated, their adoption can 
heighten environmental consciousness within corporate management, which in turn can bring 
about increased investments in waste prevention for all pollutants and reduced environmental   8
violations.  Anecdotal  evidence  indicates  that  P2  adopters  have  undertaken  significant 
investments to implement their P2 practices (The National Pollution Prevention Roundtable 
(NPPR), 1997). I therefore hypothesize that facilities that adopt P2 practices are less likely to 
violate environmental regulations than facilities that do not. 
 
Hypothesis I: Facilities that adopt P2 activities experience fewer environmental violations.  
 
However, this logic may not reflect the trade-offs that confront capital constrained firms with 
competing  investment  alternatives.    For  example,  firms  may  have  to  decide  how  many 
resources  to  invest;  alternately,  in  (1)  waste  prevention  efforts  that  reduce  emissions  of 
targeted toxic chemicals which are mostly unregulated, and (2) environmental compliance 
activities  that  reduce  emissions  of  regulated  pollutants.    Since  the  implementation  of  P2 
practices often requires costly investments, it might crowd out financial and human resources 
that could otherwise have been devoted to improving compliance.   
 
Hypothesis II: The adoption of more P2 practices yields a redirection of resources away from 
compliance activities and, therefore, leads to more environmental violations. 
 
Furthermore, the 43 P2 practices in the TRI database that are considered in this study differ 
significantly  in  their  approach  to  reduce  pollution.  Following  Deltas  et  al.  (2006),  I 
disaggregate  the  P2  practices  into  three  broad  categories.  The  first  category  consists  of 
practices that require the implementation of operating procedures such as instituting a self-
inspection and monitoring program to discover spills or leak sources, improving maintenance 
scheduling, training of employees--who are likely more familiar with the facility’s processes 
and  procedures--in  order  to  improve  environmental  performance.  I  posit  that  the   9
implementation of such facility-wide changes elicits lower violation rates because the benefits 
(lower emissions) are likely to spill over to non-target, regulated pollutants as well.  
 
Hypothesis  III:  The  adoption  of  P2  practices  that  involve  procedural  changes  lowers 
violations rates. 
 
The  second  category  consists  of  practices  that  focus  on  investment  in  environmentally 
friendly  equipment  such  as  the  installation  of  a  vapor  recovery  system,  overflow 
alarms/automatic shutoff valves, or a rinse system. The third and final category consists of 
practices that involve material modifications such as increasing purity of raw materials, input 
material  substitutions,  modifying  product  design.  Unlike  practices  centered  on  procedural 
modifications,  practices  based  on  equipment  or  material  changes  are  generally  costly  to 
implement  (Khanna  et  al.,  2005).  Faced  with  limited  resources,  managers  may  therefore 
choose to adopt such practices only to lower releases of the targeted TRI chemicals, which are 
mostly unregulated. Their adoption could conceivably worsen compliance; the reason (per 
Hypothesis  II)  is  that  the  costs  of  purchasing  and  maintenance  of  new  environmentally 
friendly equipment or material may crowd out financial resources that could otherwise be 
used to improve compliance. 
The EPA and its state branches have sought to encourage and facilitate the adoption of 
P2  activities  in  two  ways.  First,  many  state  agencies  have  instituted  Pollution Prevention 
Regulatory Integration initiatives via which inspectors identify and promote appropriate P2 
activities that may ease firms’ compliance with environmental laws (Ohio EPA, 2005; NPPR, 
1997). Second, the EPA has embedded in its enforcement settlement process the option of 
reducing fines against violators who voluntarily adopt supplemental environmental projects, 
which are voluntary P2 activities designed to remedy violations (EPA, 1998; Burnett, 1998).   10
If successful, these initiatives should increase adopting facilities’ compliance rates and relieve 
their regulatory burden. It is noted however, firms may adopt P2 activities simply to portray 
themselves  as  environmentally  responsive,  therefore  reaping  the  benefit  of  free  publicity 
afforded to all adopters without devoting the adequate financial and human resources for these 
activities  to  be  effective.
2  In  addition  to  the  reduction  of  penalties  for  adopters  of 
supplemental environmental projects, the EPA may reward P2 adopters with less scrutiny in 
its enforcement of pollution control laws, reducing the frequency of costly environmental 
inspections and enforcement actions. Thus, I anticipate that facilities that adopt P2 activities 
experience fewer enforcement actions.  
 
Hypothesis IV: Facilities that adopt P2 practices experience fewer enforcement actions 
 
Furthermore, I do my best to control for variables that have been posited in extant 
literature to affect compliance and enforcement behavior.  Such variables serve as necessary 
controls, but not as tests of any one theory per se.  Because many of these variables could 
impact both compliance and enforcement decisions, I discuss their role in both regression 
equations together. First, with the reduced informational asymmetries between polluters and 
communities,  fostered  in  part  by  the  creation  of  the  TRI  in  1988,  facilities  may  prevent 
environmental interest groups from lobbying lawmakers for tighter and costlier regulations by 
reducing their violations rates. Firms may also be the potential object of boycotts organized 
by environmentally conscious consumers and environmental interest groups (Henriques and 
Sadorsky, 1996; Baron, 2001; Innes, 2006; Sam and Innes, 2008).  For example, over the 
recent  past,  environmental  and  animal  rights  activists  have  successfully  challenged  large, 
                                                 
2 The EPA rewards P2 adopters by making their involvement known to the general public via press releases, 
awards, and other means of public recognition (http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/awards.htm).   11
powerful  firms  such  as  McDonalds  and  Home  Depot  using  boycott  tactics.
3  A  good 
compliance record may allow firms to deter such organized hostile action.   This potential 
motive  for  environmental  compliance  is  likely  to  be  greater  in  states  with  larger 
environmental constituencies.  In these states, the public sensitivity to a facility' s pollution is 
likely to be greater, as are environmental groups'  incentive and ability to successfully lobby 
the  government  for  change  and/or  to  organize  a  boycott.    Therefore,  I  hypothesize  that 
facilities in states with higher numbers of environmental constituents as proxied by per-capita 
Sierra Club membership are more likely to be compliant with environmental laws. Similar 
logic may explain why penalties are higher against facilities operating in states with larger 
environmental constituencies (Sam and Innes, 2008). To test for these potential effects of 
environmental constituencies on both compliance and enforcement, I use the per-capita Sierra 
Club membership in a facility' s home state (SIERRA). 
Second,  larger  facilities,  with  deeper  pockets,  may  be  more  compliant  with 
environmental laws in order to avoid potential liability for harm caused.  Such incentives will 
be greater in states that levy strict liability for environmental harm, as opposed to negligence 
liability  (Alberini  and  Austin,  1999).    Additionally,  enforcement  actions  may  be  higher 
against  facilities  operating  in  such  states.  I  attempt  to  capture  the  liability  motive  for 
compliance and enforcement using two variables; one for facility size proxied by TRI releases 
                                                 
3In 1999, McDonalds agreed to significant reforms in its supplier protocols for handling chickens after boycott 
actions by the animal rights  group PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of  Animals); Burger King and 
Wendy’s quickly followed suit.  Also in 1999, Home Depot agreed to phase out products using old growth 
timber  and  to  give  preference  to  timber  certified  by  the  Forest  Stewardship  Council;  other  major  home 
improvement retailers, as well as home builders, have since made similar commitments.   12
(TRI), and dummy variable taking a value of one if a plant' s home state has a strict liability 
statute (STRICT).
4   
Third,  I  posit  that  firms  that  have  adopted  Environmental  Management  Systems 
(EMS) to systematically and continuously eliminate or attenuate the adverse effects of their 
products and services on the environment are less likely to violate environmental regulations 
hence  should  experience  fewer  enforcement  actions.  Total  Quality  Environmental 
Management (TQEM) represents the most comprehensive EMS; it views pollution as quality 
defect that must be continuously reduced through the development of products and processes 
that minimize waste generation at source. Facilities whose parent companies have adopted 
TQEM may therefore be more likely to identify opportunities for waste reduction and select 
cost-effective  activities  for  reducing  pollution  thus  lowering  violations  and  enforcement 
actions. Dasgupta et al., (2002) report that EMS adoption increased compliance rates for a 
sample of Mexican facilities. The salutary effects of TQEM on violation and enforcement 
rates  are  likely  stronger  for  facilities  with  larger  toxic  releases.  I  therefore  consider  an 
interaction between TRI emissions and the TQEM adoption dummy. 
I include additional explanatory variables known to be relevant for compliance and 
enforcement activity. In particular, for the county in which a facility operates I have the time-
varying attainment status (NONATTAIN, a dummy variable that equals one if the EPA deems 
the county to be out of attainment with clean air laws), county population density (DENSITY) 
and unemployment rate (URATE). I also include one and two-year lagged count of facility 
enforcement actions (ENFit-1 and ENFit-2) as explanators of environmental violations. Several 
studies have examined the effects of enforcement activity on compliance rates (e.g, Gray and 
                                                 
4 Arguably, a better measure of facility size would be its workforce or sales. There is no sales data to my 
knowledge at the facility level. Marketing Economics Inc has facility level employment data but only up to 1993 
(Decker (2005)).     13
Deily, 1996; Stafford, 2002, 2003; Shimshack and Ward, 2005). These studies find that higher 
enforcement/inspection  actions  raise  compliance  rates.  Per  prior  work  (see  e.g  Grey  and 
Deily, 1996; Stafford, 2002; Sam and Innes, 2008), lagged violations, specifically one and 
two-year  lagged  count  of  facility-level  violations  (VIOLit-1  and  VIOLit-2),  are  included  as 
explanatory  variables  in  the  enforcement  equation.  In  examining  the  potential  role  of  P2 
activities in spurring fewer violation and enforcement rates, I allow for differences in their 
impact  across  industries  by  interacting  the  P2  dummy  with  each  of  the  12  dummies 
corresponding  to  the  industries  (two-digit  standard  industrial  classification  codes)  most 
represented in my sample (see Tables 2 and 3).  
 
III. Data 
  Several  data  sources  are  combined  in  this  study.    From  the  EPA' s  Toxic  Release 
Inventory  (TRI),  I  obtained  facility-level  data  on  chemical  releases,  primary  standard 
industrial codes (SIC), parent company names, facility locations, and P2 adoption. Section 
6607 of PPA mandates all facilities to report their P2 activities on an annual basis for each 
toxic chemical used. The P2 practices that are used in this study are specifically adopted to 
reduce TRI toxic chemicals. Many TRI chemicals are regulated under the CAA and CWA and 
other  federal  programs  but  most  of  them  are  not  regulated.  Facility-level  government 
enforcement  actions  and  compliance  status  are  obtained  from  the  Integrated  Data  for 
Enforcement  Analysis  (IDEA)  database.    IDEA  provides  a  comprehensive  report  on 
government inspections and enforcement actions for all regulated facilities. The Sierra Club 
provided data on its annual membership at the state level for the period 1991-2004.  County 
annual  unemployment  rates  (1991-2004)  and  state  GDP  growth  rates  (1991-2004)  are   14
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor) and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce), respectively.  County attainment status 
(whether a facility' s home county is designated by the EPA to be out of attainment with clean 
air  laws)  is  obtained  from  the  EPA  website  (www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/).    County 
population  density  (2000)  is  obtained  from  the  U.S.  Census.  Data  on  EMS  adoption  is 
obtained from a survey of S&P 500 firms between 1992 and 1996 by the Investor Research 
Responsibility  Center  (IRRC).
5    In  the  survey,  respondents  indicate  whether  they  have 
adopted each of a number of different environmental policies (Anton et al., 2004). The EMS 
variable, TQEM, is a dummy that takes the value of one is a facility’s parent company has 
adopted TQEM at any period between 1992 and 1996 and zero otherwise.
6  
The sample of facilities is obtained by the intersection of (i) the S&P 500 (those firms 
that responded to the IRRC surveys) and (ii) firms in the manufacturing industries responsible 
for the bulk of TRI  releases (belonging to SIC codes 20-39). Merging the environmental 
datasets and allowing for lagging gives an unbalanced panel of 1,424 facilities over the period 
1991-2004 for a total of 7,689 facility-year observations.  Table 3 presents variable definitions 
and descriptive statistics for our sample.   
Before turning to the econometric estimation, let us examine a few coarse trends from 
the data.  Figure 1 depicts the evolution of average annual violations by P2 adopters vs. non 
P2 adopters for the period 1991-2004 for the two-digit SIC codes represented in the sample. 
Plots for SICs 26 (Paper and allied products), 29 (Petroleum and coal products), 30 (Rubber 
and  plastic  products),  36  (Electrical  equipment  and  components),  and  38  (Measuring  and 
                                                 
5 I am indebted to Madhu Khanna for providing the data on EMS adoption. 
6 Since the decision to adopt TQEM is not likely to be made year to year and even if a firm were to de-adopt 
TQEM, the culture and organizational practices are likely to persist, I assume that there is no de-adoption of 
TQEM during the sample period. 
   15
analyzing instruments) show that facilities in these industries that have adopted P2 activities 
have fewer violations of environmental regulations than facilities that did not for most the 
period  of  study  (1991-2004).  The  opposite  is  observed  for  and  SIC  39  (Miscellaneous 
manufacturing  industries)  facilities.  For  SICs  28  (Chemicals  and  allied  products)  and  34 
(Fabricated  metal  products),  adopters  and  non-adopters  of  P2  practices  have  comparable 
violation rates on average during the first 10 to 11 years following the passage of the PPA. It 
is also noted that P2 adopters and non-adopters in SIC 33 (Primary metal industries) have near 
identical violation rates for entire period of study except for 2004.  There is no discernable 
pattern  of  lower  or  higher  violations  rates  by  P2-adopters  relative  non-adopters  over  the 
length of this study emerging from the remaining plots. Thus, a coarse examination of the data 
provides some preliminary confirmation of this paper’s main conjecture (Hypothesis I) for 
facilities in SICs 26, 29, 30, 36, and 38. The question of particular interest in this paper is 
whether the lower violation rates observed in these five industries can be attributed to P2 
adoption alone. The answer to this question requires a careful econometric analysis of the data 
that pays attention to potential sample selection among other issues.   
 
IV. Econometric Specification 
I estimate two equations, a violation equation and an enforcement equation, in order to 
test the empirical validity of the hypotheses discussed above. Both equations give rise to a 
number  of  econometric  issues.  First,  the  dependent  variables  VIOLit  and  ENFit--
contemporaneous facility-level violations and enforcement rates, respectively--take a count 
data form, with discrete and predominantly small values. For violations, 51.5% of the data are 
zeroes, 17.67% are ones, 13.16% are twos, and 17.67% are threes or higher.  For enforcement, 
62.35% of the data are zeroes, 14.24% are ones, 11.1% are twos, and 12.31% are threes or   16
more.  Thus  both  distributions  give  a  clear  indication  of  a  count.  I  therefore  restrict  the 
estimation to Poisson models which account for the discrete nature of the data. 
Second,  facilities  that  adopt  voluntary  P2  practices  may  not  constitute  a  random 
sample; there may be unobserved cross-sectional (facility) heterogeneity that simultaneously 
affects the decisions to adopt a voluntary P2 practice and compliance behavior. For example, 
a  firm  whose  managers/stakeholders  are  environmentally  inclined  might  experience  fewer 
violations therefore fewer enforcement actions even absent the adoption of EPA-sponsored P2 
practices. Similar logic applies to enforcement.  Failure to account for such factors could lead 
to  a  biased  and  inconsistent  estimate  of  the  effect  of  P2  adoption  on  environmental 
compliance and enforcement. Given the panel nature of the data, sample selection effects can 
be mitigated by including facility and time fixed effects in the regressions in order to control 
for omitted time-invariant characteristics and facility-invariant context variables that may be 
correlated with the P2 dummy (see e.g.,de Janvry et al., 2006; Sanyal and Menon, 2005; and 
Duffalo, 2005). Consequently, I specify a two-way (facility and time) fixed effects Poisson 
regression model to obtain consistent parameter estimates. Let n be the number of facilities 
and T the length of the time series, the econometric model is specified as 
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where the dependent variable Yit is either VIOLit or ENFit; Xit is a vector of design variables 
posited to explain Yit, ds is  a time dummy for year s,  1 b is a parameter vector conformable to 
the design vector Xit,  ) exp( i i t a = is a facility-specific non-random intercept, and the d ’s are   17
coefficients for the time dummies. It can be shown (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) based on (1) 
that the conditional joint density for the i
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Note that the facility fixed effects as well as all time-invariant variables are eliminated from 
the conditional density since they appear in both the numerator and denominator of the last 
term.  Assuming that conditional on facility and time fixed effects the P2 adoption variable is 
exogenous, the parameters ( s d b   the and , 1 ) can be estimated consistently by maximizing the 
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 The two-way fixed effects model will not correct the endogeneity of P2 adoption if there are 
time and facility-varying unobservables that impact both the decision to adopt and violation 
rates.  I  test  for  selection  effects  by  implementing  Terza' s  1998  two-step  estimator  which 
accommodates  an  endogenous  dummy  regressor  for  count  data.  The  sample  selection 
coefficient on the Terza regressions is found statistically insignificant with p-values of .56 and 
.96, respectively, for the baseline model (model 1) in Tables 4 and 5. I therefore proceed with 
the two-way fixed effects model. 
Third, similar to prior work (Gray and Deily, 1996; Nadeau, 1997; Stafford, 2002, 
2003),  emissions  are  posited  to  contemporaneously  explain  compliance  and  enforcement   18
rates. However, there conceivably exists the potential for their endogeneity.  For example, as 
argued  above,  facilities  whose  managers  or  parent  company  managers  are  more 
environmentally conscious may be more likely to comply with mandatory regulations and 
also more likely to reduce unregulated TRI chemicals. If the unobserved effects that explain 
both  compliance/enforcement  decisions  and  TRI  emissions  are  facility-specific  or  time-
specific,  then  the  two-way  estimation  framework  will  correct  the  endogeneity  problem. 
Nonetheless, I test for endogeneity of TRI releases using the Hausman test.
7  Failing to reject 
the null of exogeneity in any of the models, I proceed under the maintained hypothesis that 
contemporaneous TRI releases are exogenous in my empirical framework.   
Fourth, the fixed effects model does not account for the fact that there are repeated 
measurements over time on the same facility, which is a likely source of auto-correlation of 
the residuals for a given facility. I compute and report bootstrapped standard errors for the 




V. Regression Results 
For each of the two equations estimated in this study, I present the results of three fixed 
effects  Poisson  models  in  order  to  control  for  potential  endogeneity  of  P2  adoption  and 
distinguish between the effects of P2 practices across functional attributes industries. Model 1 
                                                 
7 I use the number of toxic chemicals used by a facility in its production process, CHEMS, and its square as the 
identifying instruments for TRI releases.  As CHEMS is highly correlated with TRI releases and should not be 
correlated with compliance except indirectly via TRI emissions, I can reasonably interpret the Hausman statistic 
as a test of exogeneity.  The estimation results for the first stage TRI emissions show that facilities using more 
chemicals have higher emissions as indicated by a positive and significant coefficient on CHEMS; but this effect 
is  subject  to  “diminishing  returns”  with  a  negative  and  statistically  significant  coefficient  on  the  square  of 
CHEMS.  These  results  are  available  upon  request.  For  both  compliance  and  enforcement  equations,  the 
Hausman test statistics are well below the critical value for a 5% significance level which is 3.84, hence the test 
fails to reject the null of exogeneity of TRI releases. 
8 Specifically, I obtained 200 bootstrap samples (of 1424 facilities each) from the data and constructed standard 
error estimates for the parameters from the resulting distribution of bootstrapped parameter estimates.   19
captures  adoption  effects  with  a  dummy  variable,  denoted  P2,  which  indicates 
contemporaneous adoption of at least one P2 practice. Model 2 separates adoption effects by 
industry with interactions of the P2 dummy in model 1 with the 12 industries (2-digit SIC) 
most represented in the study sample (see Tables 2 and 3). The third model (model 3) breaks 
P2 adoption into three dummies that represent the three functional attributes discussed above: 
whether the P2 practice involves a procedural change (P2PROC), or a change in equipment 
(P2EQUIP), or a change in materials (P2MAT). For each model, I also add 13 time (year) 
dummies to capture year-specific effects. Each of the three models is estimated assuming that 
the count of violations follows a Poisson process with individual (facility) effects that are 
fixed.  
 
1. The compliance equation. Table 4 presents estimation results of the compliance equation.  
In all three models, the time dummies are all statistically significant and show an upward 
trend  in  environmental  violations.  The  results  do  not  indicate  that  P2  adoption  prompts 
significant reductions in environmental violations across all industries; the coefficient of the 
P2 dummy is positive but statistically insignificant in model 1 with a proportional marginal 
effect  of  2.63%  (p-value  =  0.39).
9  Hence  model  1  does  not  lend  support  to  my  main 
conjecture (Hypothesis I). This result, in and of itself, does not show ineffectiveness of P2 
adoption in attaining its ultimate goal of reducing emissions of targeted chemicals since most 
TRI chemicals are unregulated, but it suggests that the benefits derived from P2 adoption, if 
any,  do  not  spill  over  to  regulated  pollutants.  Further  investigation  of  the  impact  of  P2 
                                                 
9These numbers are obtained by dividing the marginal effect of P2 adoption obtained from model 1 (0.044) by 
the average number of violations per facility per year (1.7). I also estimated all three models using the count of 
adopted P2s and its interactions with the nine two-digit SIC dummies most represented in the sample in lieu of 
the adoption dummy. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones with the P2 dummy and are available upon 
request.   20
adoption on TRI releases would constitute a valuable contribution. Furthermore, the use of a 
single variable to explore the impact of P2 adoption for all facilities, as done in model 1, may 
mask  differences  in  the  impact  of  the  P2  program  across  industries  and  attributes  of  P2 
practices.  To discern between impacts across industries, I replaced the P2 variable in model 1 
with a set of 12 interactions of the variable P2 with two-digit industry codes for industries 
represented in my sample. The results (models 2) show that P2 adoption has the expected (per 
Hypothesis I) negative and statistically significant impact on violations for three industries in 
the  manufacturing  sector  which  are  Paper  and  allied  products  (SIC  26),  Primary  metal 
industries (SIC 33), and Electrical equipment and components (SIC 36). Table 6 presents the 
proportional marginal effects of P2 adoption on violation rates for the  12 industries. The 
proportional marginal effects are obtained by dividing the marginal effect of P2 adoption for 
each industry by the corresponding industry’s average annual environmental violations. P2 
adoption  is  estimated  to  lower  violation  rates  by  19%  for  facilities  in  SIC  26,  17%  for 
facilities in SIC 33, and 27% for facilities in SIC 36. These reductions are both statistically 
and economically significant. Conversely, P2 adoption is estimated to increase violation rates 
by 24% for SIC 28 (Chemical and Allied Products) facilities, and 16% for SIC 37 facilities. A 
possible  explanation  for  this  outcome  (per  Hypothesis  II)  is  that  P2  adoption  in  these 
industries  (SICs  28,  and  37),  to  the  extent  that  facilities  take  it  seriously,  diverts  scarce 
financial  resources  away  from  compliance  activities  to  the  implementation  of  costly  P2 
practices that focus on chemicals not directly regulated. In such scenario, P2 adoption may 
work to reduce emissions of the targeted chemicals while worsening firms’ compliance with 
mandatory environmental regulations.  
Model 3 partitions the 43 P2 practices into the three previously defined categories in   21
order  to  assess  if  the  impact  of  P2  practices  depends  on  their  approach  to  improve 
compliance.  In  my  sample,  on  average  thirty  percent  of  adopted  P2  practices  require 
procedural  changes  (first  category),  eighteen  percent  require  equipment/technology 
modifications (second category), and thirty two percent involve material substitution/changes 
(third category). The raining P2 practices could not be unambiguously classified into any of 
the three groups and therefore are omitted from the regression analysis as in Deltas et al. 
(2006).  The  results  in  model  3  show  that  the  coefficient  on  P2PROC  is  negative  and 
statistically significant; the proportional marginal effect (marginal effect divided by average 
number of violations) of P2PROC indicates that the adoption of an additional P2 practice that 
involves facility-wide changes operating procedures reduces violations rates by about 13.5% 
for all industries, giving evidence in support of Hypothesis III. Conversely, the coefficients of 
P2EQEUIP  and  P2MAT  are  statistically  insignificant  indicating  that  the  impact  of  P2 
practices in the other two categories (equipment and material changes), if any, are limited to 
targeted and mostly unregulated chemicals.  Since all P2 practices in this study are adopted to 
reduce emissions of mostly unregulated toxic chemicals, the econometric results suggest that 
only  practices  in  the  first  category  yield  positive  spillover  effects  on  the  emissions  of 
regulated pollutants in the manufacturing sector.  
Other  important  results  emerge  from  Table  4.  In  particular,  I  find  evidence  that 
facilities  are  motivated  to  lower  violation  rates  in  order  to  preempt  lobbying  or  boycott 
campaigns by environmental constituencies which might result in additional regulation (with 
a statistically significant negative coefficient on SIERRA).  However, the preemption effect is 
subject to diminishing marginal return with a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on the square of SIERRA.  Still, the estimated marginal effect of SIERRA (evaluated at its   22
sample mean) is negative, yielding reductions in the number of violations of 0.34 or 20% 
based on the average annual number of violations for all facilities in the manufacturing sector.  
Furthermore, all three specifications show that TQEM adoption is found to be effective at 
lowering violation rates for dirtier facilities with higher TRI as posited in the paper, with a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between TQEM and TRI. 
Consonant  with  prior  work  (e.g,  Stafford,  2002),  I  also  find  that  facilities  with  higher 
emissions  (TRI)  have  a  higher  violation  rates.  In  addition,  I  find  that  prior  enforcement 
actions spur subsequent reduced violations  with a two-year lag, and that one-year lagged 
enforcement actions are associated with more violations. Helland (1998) also finds a similar 
result  and  argues  that  violators  need  one  year  to  come  to  compliance  because  violations 
generally stem from inadequate environmental technologies which may require a significant 
amount of time to be corrected. Other determinants for violations are county unemployment 
rates, county density and attainment status with clean air laws. Finally, the results show that 
facilities  in  counties  with  higher  unemployment  are  less  likely  to  violate  environmental 
standards.  The  opposite  is  observed  for  facilities  in  counties  deemed  by  the  EPA  out  of 
attainment with clean air laws. 
 
2. The Enforcement equation. The results of the enforcement equation are presented in Table 
5.  Enforcement  actions  are  important  because  they  represent  the  prospect  for  potentially 
costly disputes between a facility and government regulators.  Even actions considered minor 
in and of themselves are notices that, if regulators are not quickly satisfied with compliance 
measures,  can  be  followed  by  costly  legal  disputes,  remedies  and  penalties.
10    Hence,  a 
                                                 
10 Enforcement actions can range from notices of violation to administrative orders for compliance to initiations 
of  civil  lawsuits  to  filing  criminal  charges  against  responsible  firms  and  individuals   23
potentially  important  reward  to  P2  adoption  may  be  the  prospect  of  a  less  adversarial 
relationship with environmental regulators that results in fewer enforcement actions. I find 
that enforcement actions have trended upwards perhaps to match the increase in violation 
rates over time documented in Table 4.  
Turning to the qualitative results, I find in all three models that a facility’s history of 
environmental violations is positively associated with subsequent government enforcement 
actions, consonant with Harrington’s targeting model (1988). Facilities in strict liability states 
are more likely to receive an enforcement action. In addition, the results show that facilities in 
higher unemployment counties are less likely to receive an enforcement action. Surprisingly, I 
find  that  enforcement  rates  tend  to  fall  when  there  is  more  environmentalist  pressure  on 
facilities, as measured by the Sierra Club variable (SIERRA); environmental pressure thus 
substitutes  for  government  enforcement  activity  in  promoting  environmental  objectives.
11 
Perhaps more importantly for the purpose of this paper, I find no evidence in favor of the 
“regulatory  responsiveness”  theory  (Maxwell  and  Decker,  2006);  P2  adoption  is  not 
associated with a statistically significant reduction in regulatory scrutiny on average for the 
manufacturing sector, based on model 1. This result is in contrast to Sam and Innes’s (2008) 
finding  that  regulators  rewarded  33/50  program  participants  by  reducing  inspections  and 
enforcement actions. There are two key differences between the 33/50 and the P2 programs 
that  may  explain  these  different  conclusions.  First,  the  33/50  program  was  the  EPA' s  first 
formal  effort  to  achieve  voluntary  pollution  reductions  by  regulated  firms.  To  induce  33/50 
                                                                                                                                                         
(www.epa.gov/region9/enforcement).  Beyond legal costs, costs to firms of remedies and penalties can be very 
large.  For example, recent enforcement actions in EPA’s Region 4 under the CAA have led to remedies and 
penalties ranging from the very small to over $130 million (www.epa.gov/region4/ead/general/recent). 
11One might argue that environmental constituencies may pressure government agencies for more enforcement 
actions;  my  results  suggest,  in  contrast,  that  government  agencies  recognize  the  salutary  effects  of 
environmentalism on facility performance and therefore may compensate for this added community pressure on 
facilities by exercising less regulatory oversight. 
   24
participation and associated pollution abatement, the EPA could have afforded participants a 
less  adversarial  treatment  of  potential  infractions,  with  fewer  costly  inspections  and 
enforcement  actions  –  over  and  beyond  reductions  in  enforcement  rates  due  to  reduced 
pollution. Second, the P2 program is far broader in scope than the 33/50; it seeks to prevent or 
reduce waste generation of some 650 chemicals in the TRI database while the 33/50 targeted 
seventeen high-use toxic chemicals with specific pollution reduction goals. Between 1991 and 
1995, over half of all TRI facilities had adopted at least one P2 practice. In the same period, 
only 12% of eligible firms had joined the 33/50 program.  
As in Decker (2005), I examine in model 2 whether the effects of P2 adoption vary by 
industry. In doing so, I find evidence in support of the “regulatory responsiveness” theory per 
Hypothesis IV of reduced enforcement actions for three industries which are: Fabricated metal 
products  (SIC  34),  Transportation  equipment  (SIC  37),  and  Measuring  and  analyzing 
instruments (SIC 38) perhaps because of supplemental environmental projects or because of 
enforcement rewards for P2 adoption. Table 6 displays the proportional marginal effects of P2 
adoption on enforcement. P2 adoption-induced reductions in enforcement rates are large in 
both statistical and economic senses for these three industries, with annual reductions of 42% 
for  SIC  34,  25%  for  SIC  37,  and  49%  for  SIC  38.  Decker  (2005)  reports  similar  mixed 
evidence of voluntary pollution abatement on the regulatory behavior. He finds that voluntary 
environmental investments by firms  in the form of lower TRI releases resulted in fewer state 
inspection visits for plants in two industries (Chemical Manufacturing, Pulp and Paper) but 
had no statistically significant effect in two other industries (Iron and Steel, and Petroleum 
Refining).  Finally, model 3 examines whether enforcement rewards are contingent on the 
functional  attributes  of  the  adopted  practices.  The  results  suggest  that  the  adoption  of   25
practices that require procedural or equipment changes yield reduced enforcement rates while 
the adoption of practices that involve material changes do not. This is perhaps because the 
implementation of practices based on procedural and equipment changes involves a credible 
commitment by facilities to improve environmental performance: training their employees 
and/or undertaking significant investments in cleaner technologies. Maxwell and Decker’s 
(2006) show the regulator will ease regulatory oversight on firms that make credible voluntary 
environmental investments.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
Voluntary  pollution  prevention  has  gained  increased  prominence  among  private  firms 
following  the  passage  of  the  1990  Pollution  Prevention  Act  which  established  a  national 
policy that promotes source reductions instead of waste management. The main purpose of 
this paper is to test empirically the impact of P2 adoption on compliance and enforcement. In 
doing so, I use a sample of 1424 facilities whose parent companies are S&P500 firms over the 
period 1991-2004 for a total of 7681 facility-year observations.  I find that P2 adoption spurs 
a decline in environmental violations for facilities in three industries (SICs 26, 33 36); the 
converse is observed for facilities in two other industries, namely SICs 28 and 37. Similarly, I 
find that only P2 adopters in three industries (SICs 34, 37 and 38) experienced statistically 
significant  reductions  of  enforcement  actions  attributable  to  P2  adoption.  Because  P2 
practices differ in their approach to prevent pollution, I disaggregate them into three broad 
categories and find that practices that involve changes in operating procedures spur fewer 
violations for all facilities while practices based on equipment or material substitutions do not. 
I  also find a causal relationship between P2 practices based on improved procedures and   26
cleaner  manufacturing  technology,  and  lower  enforcement  actions.  Overall,  this  work 
indicates that (1) some, not all, P2 practices are effective at improving compliance; (2) the 
combination of procedures-based P2 practices and enforcement rewards for their adoption can 
significantly enhance environmental compliance. Finally, the results show that facilities in 
states  with  higher  per  capita  environmental  membership,  that  levy  strict  liability  for 
environmental harm, and facilities that operate in counties that are out of attainment with 
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Figure 1: Average Violation Rates for Adopters vs. non-adopters of Pollution Prevention Practices over the Period 1991-2004 for 
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Table 1: List of EPA-Sponsored Pollution Prevention Practices 
 
Good Operating Practices 
W13 Improved maintenance scheduling, recordkeeping, or procedures 
W14 Changed production schedule to minimize equipment and feedstock changeovers 
W19 Other changes in operating practices 
 
Inventory Control Activities 
W21 Instituted procedures to ensure that materials do not stay in inventory beyond shelf-life 
W22 Began to test outdated material — continue to use if still effective 
W23 Eliminated shelf-life requirements for stable materials 
W24 Instituted better labeling procedures 
W25 Instituted clearinghouse to exchange materials that would otherwise be discarded 
W29 Other changes in inventory control 
 
Spill and Leak Prevention Activities 
W31 Improved storage or stacking procedures 
W32 Improved procedures for loading, unloading, and transfer operations 
W33 Installed overflow alarms or automatic shutoff valves 
W35 Installed vapor recovery systems 
W36 Implemented inspection or monitoring program of potential spill or leak sources 
W39 Other spill and leak prevention  
 
Raw Material Modifications 
W41 Increased purity of raw materials 
W42 Substituted raw materials 
W49 Other raw material modifications  
 
Process Modifications 
W51 Instituted recirculation within a process 
W52 Modified equipment, layout, or piping 
W53 Use of a different process catalyst 
W54 Instituted better controls on operating bulk containers to minimize discarding of empty containers 
W55 Changed from small volume containers to bulk containers to minimize discarding of empty containers 
W58 Other process modifications  
 
Cleaning and Degreasing Activities 
W59 Modified stripping/cleaning equipment 
W60 Changed to mechanical stripping/cleaning devices (from solvents or other materials) 
W61 Changed to aqueous cleaners (from solvents or other materials) 
W63 Modified containment procedures for cleaning 
W64 Improved draining procedures 
W65 Redesigned parts racks to reduce dragout 
W66 Modified or installed rinse systems 
W67 Improved rinse equipment design 
W68 Improved rinse equipment operation   33
Table 1: List of EPA-Sponsored Pollution Prevention Practices (Continued) 
 
W71 Other cleaning and degreasing modifications 
 
Surface Preparation and Finishing Activities 
W72 Modified spray systems or equipment 
W73 Substituted coating materials used 
W74 Improved application techniques 
W75 Changed from spray to other system 
W78 Other surface preparation and finishing modifications 
 
Product Modifications 
W81 Changed product specifications 
W82 Modified design or composition of product 
W83 Modified packaging 





Table 2: List of US Manufacturing Industries 
 
SIC code  Industry 
20  Foods and kindred products 
21  Tobacco manufacturing 
22  Textile mill products 
23  Apparel and other textile products 
24  Lumber and wood products 
25  Furniture and fixtures 
26  Paper and allied products 
27  Printing and publishing 
28  Chemicals and allied products 
29  Petroleum and coal products 
30  Rubber and misc. plastic products 
31  Leather and leather products 
32  Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 
33  Primary metal industries 
34  Fabricated metal products 
35  Industrial machinery and computer equipment 
36  Electrical equipment and components 
37  Transportation equipment 
38  Measuring and analyzing instruments 
39  Misc. manufacturing industries 
 
Source: www.siccode.com 




Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Data 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
      Deviation 
        
P2  0.2922  0.4548 
ENFORCE  1.0743  3.6386 
TRI  0.3917  3.5362 
NONATTAIN  0.2108  0.4079 
LIABILITY  0.7613  0.4263 
SIERRA  1.6792  1.0970 
TQEM  0.5483  0.4977 
URATE  5.3196  1.4349 
DENSITY  916.31  1413.01 
SIC 24  0.0213  0.1445 
SIC 26  0.0692  0.2538 
SIC 28  0.1873  0.3902 
SIC 29  0.0209  0.1432 
SIC 30  0.0367  0.1880 
SIC 33  0.0784  0.2689 
SIC 34  0.1416  0.3487 
SIC 35  0.1134  0.3171 
SIC 36  0.0788  0.2695 
SIC 37  0.1749  0.3799 
SIC 38  0.0254  0.1572 
SIC 39  0.0121  0.1093 
Number of observations  7689    
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